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Abstract
The procedures of canonical quantization of the gravitational field apparently lead to entities for which any interpretation in terms of spatio-temporal localization or spatio-temporal extension seems difficult. This fact is the main ground for the suggestion that can often be found in the physics literature on canonical quantum gravity according to which spacetime may not be fundamental in some sense. This paper aims to investigate this radical suggestion from an ontologically serious point of view in the cases of two standard forms of canonical quantum gravity, quantum geometrodynamics and loop quantum gravity. We start by discussing the physical features of the quantum wave functional of quantum geometrodynamics and of the spin networks (and spin foams) of loop quantum gravity that motivate the view according to which spacetime is not fundamental. We then point out that, by contrast, for any known ontologically serious understanding of quantum entanglement, the commitment to spacetime seems indispensable. Against this background, we then critically discuss the idea that spacetime may emerge from more fundamental entities. As a consequence, we finally suggest that the emergence of classical spacetime in canonical quantum gravity faces a dilemma: either spacetime ontologically emerges from more fundamental non-spatio-temporal entities or it already belongs to the fundamental quantum gravitational level and the emergence of the classical picture is merely a matter of levels of description. On the first horn of the dilemma, it is unclear how to make sense of concrete physical entities that are not in spacetime and of the notion of ontological emergence that is involved. The second horn runs into the difficulties raised by the physics of canonical quantum gravity.
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1.	Introduction
The ontological status of space and time (or spacetime) and their relationship with matter are among the most important and crucial issues in philosophy of nature as well as in fundamental physics. One of the central aims of a theory of quantum gravity (QG) is to describe in a consistent way the relationship (‘interaction’) between matter as conceived by quantum field theory (QFT) – that is, quantum fields – and dynamical spacetime as treated by general relativity (GR). As a consequence, a QG theory is expected to provide a better understanding of the fundamental nature of spacetime.
This last point is especially salient in the framework of canonical QG, where canonical quantization is applied to GR, that is, to the gravitational (or metric) field. Since this latter encodes the spacetime geometry in the classical theory, its quantized version can be expected to reveal more fundamental (quantum) aspects of spacetime and gravitation. However, the procedures of canonical quantization of the gravitational field apparently lead to entities for which any interpretation in terms of spatio-temporal localization or spatio-temporal extension seems difficult. This fact is the main ground for the suggestion that can often be found in the physics literature on canonical QG according to which spacetime may not be fundamental in some sense (see for instance the standard textbooks on canonical QG, Rovelli 2004, ch. 10, and Kiefer 2007, ch. 5). This paper aims to investigate this radical suggestion from an ontologically serious point of view in the ‘concrete’ cases of two standard forms of canonical QG, quantum geometrodynamics and loop quantum gravity (LQG), with applications to cosmology.
We start by discussing the physical features of the quantum wave functional of quantum geometrodynamics and of the spin networks (and spin foams) of LQG that motivate the view according to which spacetime is not fundamental (section 2). We then point out that, by contrast, for any known ontologically serious understanding of quantum entanglement, the commitment to spacetime seems indispensable (section 3). Against this background, we then critically discuss the idea that spacetime may emerge from more fundamental entities (section 4). As a consequence, we finally suggest that the emergence of classical spacetime in canonical QG faces a dilemma (section 5): either spacetime ontologically emerges from more fundamental non-spatio-temporal entities or it already belongs to the fundamental QG level and the emergence of the classical picture is merely a matter of levels of description. On the first horn of the dilemma, it is unclear how to make sense of concrete physical entities that are not in spacetime and of the notion of ontological emergence that is involved. The second horn runs into the difficulties raised by the physics of QG.
To the extent that they rely on on-going research programmes rather than well-defined (and well-tested) physical theories, our investigations in this paper remain speculative; however, we argue that they constitute mandatory attempts at providing an interpretative framework that is metaphysically serious about one of the major conceptual challenges raised by quantum gravity, namely the ontological status of spacetime at the fundamental level.
2.	The disappearance of spacetime in canonical quantum gravity
2.1	Quantum geometrodynamics
Quantum geometrodynamics is the most straightforward canonical quantization of GR (cast in the constrained Hamiltonian formalism) in the sense that it naturally considers the 3-metric and its conjugate momentum (functional of the corresponding extrinsic curvature) as the canonical variables. The quantum Hamiltonian constraint acts on (wave) functionals of the 3-metric (and of the matter fields), giving rise to the famous Wheeler-DeWitt equation. Within this framework, the claim that spacetime is not fundamental is mainly based on four interrelated aspects of quantum geometrodynamics. 
	(QGeom-1) The Wheeler-DeWitt equation does not contain any explicit time parameter, unlike the Schrödinger equation for instance; accordingly – and putting aside the mathematical difficulties related to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation – it is difficult to interpret this equation in dynamical terms, as describing the temporal evolution of a physical system (such as a 3-metric). Of course, that’s one aspect of the ‘problem of time’, which finds its roots in the background independence and diffeomorphism invariance of classical GR already. One way to deal with this ‘problem of time’ is to accept that it indicates that time might not be a fundamental feature of the world. An analogous argument (with respect to the momentum or 3-diffeomorphism constraint) can be brought up about space as well (although without any analogous ‘problem of space’).
	(QGeom-2) The wave functional of quantum geometrodynamics is not defined on spacetime, but on the (configuration) space of all 3-metrics (if matter is considered, it might also depend on the matter degrees of freedom). It is not at all clear how to relate a wave functional on configuration space satisfying the Hamiltonian and momentum constraints to any description of (classical) spacetime. Indeed the obstacles are many. The wave functional does not determine any curve in configuration space that would straightforwardly correspond to some spacetime. The quantum wave functional is typically understood in terms of probabilities, whose meaning is conceptually challenging in this context (the measurement problem is especially acute in this context), making the link with a spacetime picture rather elusive (Butterfield and Isham 1999, § 5.3). Moreover, on the technical side, the difficulties to construct any mathematically well-defined inner-product for the wave functionals infect the very definition of quantum-mechanical probability (Kiefer 2007, § 5.2.2).
	(QGeom-3) The non-vanishing commutator between the canonical variables, that is, between the 3-metric and the corresponding functional of the extrinsic curvature, which describes the embedding of the 3-metric into spacetime, seems to forbid any (classical) spacetime understanding (analogous to the fate of quantum particle trajectories in quantum mechanics; see Kiefer 2007, § 5.1).
	(QGeom-4) Strictly speaking, the full wave functional of the universe (i.e. including all gravitational and matter degrees of freedom) is a huge quantum superposition of many components (which may possibly each receive a ‘quasi-classical’ understanding under certain conditions, see below). It seems difficult to see in what sense such superposition of (functionals of) 3-metrics can be said to describe space(time). 
These aspects highlight two types of difficulties for any spatio-temporal understanding: first, the aspects related to the background independence and the dynamics of the theory (QGeom-1) and second, the aspects related to the interpretative issues in quantum theory (QGeom-2, -3, -4) (these latter being aggravated by the former, see below). Let us now turn to the other standard form of canonical quantum gravity.
2.2	Loop quantum gravity
One of the main motivations for considering alternative canonical variables for the canonical quantization of GR is to alleviate the mathematical difficulties that plague the constraints of quantum geometrodynamics – in particular the non-polynomial dependence of the constraints on the 3-metric. The choice of the ‘Ashtekar variables’ as canonical variables – basically a SU(2) connection and its corresponding densitized tetrad – lies at the basis of the LQG programme: indeed it opens new and mathematically more rigorous perspectives on the quantum constraints expressed in terms of these variables. The central variables of LQG are the spin network states (suitably defined ‘cylindrical’ (wave) functionals of the SU(2) connection associated with abstract graphs carrying irreducible representations of SU(2)), which form an orthonormal basis in the kinematical Hilbert space of the theory. This latter space can be constructed so that its states are invariant under ‘local’ SU(2) gauge transformations and under 3-diffeomorphisms, i.e. so that the Gauss and (LQG version of the) momentum quantum constraints are satisfied; this kinematical Hilbert space is interpreted as the space of the quantum states of the 3-gravitational field (matter degrees of freedom can be in principle incorporated in the description – very roughly, attaching irreducible representations of the relevant gauge groups to the links of the spin networks). At the kinematical level, several important aspects of LQG ground the claim that space is not fundamental (although such explicit claim about space at the kinematical level is specific to LQG, these aspects – apart from (LQG-1) below – are basically LQG counterparts of those discussed within quantum geometrodynamics). We highlight two of them, which are important for the discussion.
	(LQG-1) One of the most important results of LQG is that area and volume operators can be defined on the kinematical Hilbert space and turn out to have discrete spectra (spin network states being eigenstates of these geometrical operators). This result is naturally interpreted as an indication of the fundamental discrete nature of space, which (to some extent) can be pictorially represented by spin network graphs, with the nodes representing ‘quanta’ (or ‘atoms’) of space (3-volume) and links representing ‘quanta’ of surfaces (2-surface) separating the ‘quanta’ of volume attached to the corresponding nodes. This discreteness often lies at the heart of the claim about the non-fundamentality of space within LQG (e.g. Wüthrich 2011). What is meant with this claim is that the smooth structure of space as described within classical GR is not fundamental (but may be only approximate in some sense). But this claim alone does not imply that space itself is (ontologically) non-fundamental. The discrete spectra of the geometrical operators are an important (and specific) consequence – prediction – of the theory (rather than a mere assumption as in lattice QFT), and it might be indeed tempting to consider the discrete spin network picture of LQG as evidence that the theory takes space to be a fundamental entity, albeit a discrete one. However, as Rovelli (2011, § 2.4) points out, one should be careful with any too literal reading of such a geometrical picture within this context (there are different – not necessarily ontologically equivalent – geometrical understandings of the spin networks). But the main objection against the fundamentality of space (and spacetime) comes from a more basic quantum feature of the theory.
	(LQG-2) A generic quantum state at the kinematical level of the theory (i.e. a quantum state of ‘space’ or of the 3-gravitational field) is not a spin network state, but a quantum superposition thereof. As a consequence, the just mentioned geometrical (and intuitive) interpretation of spin networks (literally) describing discrete space breaks down. It is not at all clear in what sense such quantum superpositions could still be considered as representing physical, 3-dimensional space (Rovelli 2004, § 6.7.1 and § 10.1.3 makes the point clear).
This last aspect is of central importance: the basic quantum feature of linear superposition can be convincingly argued to constitute one of the major obstacles for considering space(time) as fundamental within canonical quantum gravity. The crucial point is common to LQG and quantum geometrodynamics: (LQG-2) is the LQG and kinematical version of (QGeom-4), and the argument from quantum superposition can also be raised against spacetime at the dynamical level of LQG.
The discussion about spacetime necessarily involves the dynamical part of the theory, in particular the LQG version of the quantum Hamiltonian constraint and of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation. How to solve this constraint (equation) remains an open issue, but the situation is arguably mathematically more rigorous than in the quantum geometrodynamical case (e.g. a Hamiltonian or Wheeler-DeWitt constraint operator can be rigorously constructed to some extent, see Thiemann 2007, ch. 10). As can be expected, the implementation of this constraint operator displays no explicit time parameter and cannot be easily interpreted in terms of temporal evolution. Indeed, the situation is much analogous to the case of quantum geometrodynamics, see (QGeom-1) above.
Although this paper is mainly concerned with the canonical approach to quantum gravity, we would like to mention the fact that the issues about the non-fundamentality of time (and space) within LQG can be considered from a covariant point of view as well. (The links and convergences between the canonical and covariant frameworks of LQG in recent years have prompted Rovelli 2011 to argue that LQG should better be considered as a theory on its own rather than ‘only’ a quantized version of GR.) Indeed, the dynamics of the theory can be fully understood in terms of transition probability amplitudes for spin network states. The transition amplitudes do not depend explicitly on time and cannot be understood as transition amplitudes between states in time (as in standard, background dependent QFT), even if they can be understood as transition amplitudes between spin network states – from a covariant point of view, a single spin network state, understood as a boundary state (think of a finite spacetime region bounded by some 3-space), can be directly associated with such an amplitude. Within this framework, it is useful to consider the ‘dynamics’ of spin networks and the relevant transition probability amplitudes in terms of spin foams, which can be understood intuitively as higher-dimensional (Feynman-type) ‘graphs’ (‘2-complexes’) describing the ‘evolution’ of the spin networks (‘1-complexes’). The transition amplitude between two spin network states (or for a single ‘boundary’ spin network) is then understood in terms of a sum over the amplitudes of the spin foams with the corresponding boundary. The difficulty to relate the spin foam account of the spin network ‘dynamics’ to any description of spacetime can be highlighted by the analogy with Feynman’s path integrals in QM: the (possibly discrete) spacetimes associated with the spin foams have much the same status as the paths (trajectories) in the path integral version of QM. Note that this is the covariant version of the difficulties with time (and space) already encountered above. We close this section by further noting that the LQG counterparts of (QGeom-2) and (QGeom-3) can also be explicitly raised against the fundamentality of spacetime within this theory.
3.	The indispensability of spacetime in the worked out ontologies of quantum physics
3.1	Non-separability, entanglement, and structural realism
One of the main arguments for the disappearance of spacetime in canonical QG draws on the superposition principle (see QGeom-4 and LQG-2 above). Whatever the ontological significance of the superposition principle may be, it is the basis for quantum entanglement (which seems indeed prevalent at the QG level, see section 4.1). There is ample evidence from experiments on entangled quantum systems that rules out any ignorance interpretation of quantum theory in terms of an underlying ontology of classical particles. Even in Bohm’s theory, which matches the predictions of textbook quantum mechanics on the basis of an ontology of particles with definite trajectories in spacetime, entanglement is taken into account in terms of a non-classical, holistic connection among the particles, although the superposition principle does not have any ontological significance in Bohm’s quantum theory (see below for a brief discussion of the main interpretations). Schrödinger famously called entanglement with good reason not “one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought” (1935, p. 555).
What does entanglement mean for a concrete ontology for quantum systems? The common philosophical understanding of entanglement invokes a principle of non-separability. The notion of non-separability provides for a concrete physical ontology of entanglement in terms of the following two conditions: (a) two or more quantum systems are non-separable iff, despite their being separated in space, it is not possible to attribute a state to each of them that completely specifies its dynamical properties (see Howard 1985 and Healey 1989 for specifications of the principle of non-separability). (b) Why is this not possible? Because the development of the dynamical properties of the two or more systems is tied together. The evidence for this is that the manipulation of one system changes the probabilities for measurement outcomes on the other systems, as shown by the EPR-Bohm experiments on pairs of quantum systems of spin 1/2 (or pairs of photons) in the singlet state. The theorem of John Bell (1964, reprinted in Bell 1987, ch. 2) proofs that it is not possible to account for the non-local correlations manifested in these experiments in terms of the preparation of the singlet state at the source of the experiment being the common cause of these correlations.
Hence, the ontology of quantum entanglement that has been well developed in the literature on non-relativistic quantum mechanics provides for a clear and serious ontological view under the following two presuppositions:
(1) The quantum systems are separated in space; against this background, they are non-separable in the sense that they do not possess separate states each. Consequently, this ontology presupposes that the systems to which it applies are inserted in spacetime and are somehow localized in spacetime.
(2) The dynamics for these systems is non-local: local manipulations of one system (that, again, has to be localized so that it can be subject to a local manipulation) change ‘immediately’ (hence the tension with Lorentz invariance) the probabilities for measurement outcomes on the other systems, whatever their spatio-temporal distance may be. All the major interpretations of quantum theory take Bell’s theorem and the subsequent experiments to establish a non-locality of the quantum domain in the following sense: the probabilities for certain measurement outcomes to be obtained at a certain spacetime point are not completely determined by what there is in the past light-cone of that point; quite to the contrary, events that occur at points separated by a spacelike interval from that point contribute to determining the probabilities for what happens at that point.
Going from non-relativistic QM to relativistic QFT does not touch the mentioned two points: there is non-separability of states across spacelike separated regions and a non-local dynamics concerning the development of the probability distributions of operators applying to spacelike separated regions. As regards the demand for a Lorentz-invariant account of these correlations, QFT is in no better position than non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
Over the last fifteen years or so, the philosophical literature has moved on from an account of quantum entanglement in terms of non-separability to an account in terms of ontic structural realism (OSR) (Ladyman 1998, French and Ladyman 2003, Esfeld 2004). A structure can in this context be regarded as a network of concrete physical relations (such as the mentioned quantum correlations) that do not require underlying objects which possess an intrinsic identity, that is, an identity which is independent of these relations. In the course of the further development of OSR, a controversy has arisen about the ontological status of objects in the structures to which OSR is committed, with variants of OSR being proposed that reach from eliminativism about objects (French and Ladyman 2003) via the view of objects being constituted by relations (Ladyman and Ross 2007, ch. 2 to 4) to a moderate OSR that acknowledges objects on the same ontological footing as relations (Esfeld 2004, Esfeld and Lam 2008, Floridi 2008) (see Ainsworth 2010 for an overview). However, recent publications suggest that this is only a verbal dispute: OSR cannot acknowledge anything stronger than what French (2010, sect. 7) dubs “thin objects”, namely objects for which it is constitutive to stand in the relations (the structure) in question. Esfeld and Lam (2011, sect. 8.3) propose to regard the relations (structures) as the ways in which the objects are. In short, the objects in question do not have a being in distinction to the relations (structures) in which they stand. It then is a merely verbal matter whether or not one grants the label “objects” to such entities.
The point that is important for the present paper is the following one: OSR is a proposal for a concrete and complete ontology of the fundamental physical domain, claiming that all there is in this domain are structures in the mentioned sense and that we can in principle know these structures. It thereby stands in contrast to epistemic structural realism (ESR) according to which, in brief, we have knowledge only about the structure of the physical world (whose mathematical representation is claimed to be invariant through theory change), but not about the objects that implement the structure in question (Worrall 1989). In short, OSR claims to be a full scientific realism, whereas ESR is only a partial realism.
For this distinction to be a real by contrast to a merely verbal one, OSR has to be precise about what it takes the concrete structures to be, that is to say, what it takes the concrete entities to be that implement or instantiate the structures in question – otherwise, it would also be only a partial realism. This requirement implies the commitment to spacetime: the structures that OSR admits are concrete physical structures through their being embedded, implemented or instantiated in spacetime. Without the commitment to spacetime, it would simply be unknown as in ESR what the entities are that implement or instantiate the mathematical structure of the theory in question.
Spacetime can of course itself be a concrete physical structure, consisting in metrical relations between spacetime points (Esfeld and Lam 2008). In this case, spacetime points are the thin objects in the sense of French (2010) for which it is constitutive to stand in the metrical relations, or the objects whose way of being in the sense of Esfeld and Lam (2011) are the metrical relations (in this sense, OSR provides a natural substantivalist understanding of spacetime – and spacetime points – that accounts for the GR features of diffeomorphism invariance and background independence; however, strictly speaking, OSR is not committed to spacetime points, see Esfeld and Lam 2008, §4).
3.2	The major ontological interpretations of quantum mechanics
Let us illustrate the claims just made by going briefly into the major ontological interpretations of QM for the sake of simplicity (taking QFT into account would not change the point at issue). On the Everett interpretation, there are (infinitely) many branches of the universe existing in parallel without interfering with each other (they do not interfere due to decoherence). The Everett interpretation spells non-separability and OSR out in terms of a structure being implemented by (“thin”) objects that are copied many times in non-interfering branches and whose dynamical properties have determinate values that are correlated within each branch (“relative state”). There is no intrinsic identity of objects in a branch, since the values of their dynamical properties depend on the values of the dynamical properties of the other objects in that branch. That structure develops according to a global law applying to the universe as a whole (such as the Schrödinger equation in non-relativistic QM).
This structure is a concrete physical structure (by contrast to structures defined on an abstract mathematical space) through its being implemented in spacetime. If one takes spacetime to be something like a background structure that is exempt from the process of branching, then one has to come to terms with the consequence that contradictory predicates apply to one and the same spacetime region, or even contradictory properties are instantiated by one and the same spacetime region – such as Schrödinger’s cat being alive and the same cat being dead existing in or being properties of the same unique spacetime region. The fact that these properties are conceived as branch-relative does not change that matter, as long as these branches are supposed to exist in one and the same unique region of four-dimensional spacetime: that many branches exist in or are properties of the same spacetime region simply amounts to saying that, for instance, the cat being alive and the same cat being dead exist in or are properties of the same spacetime region. Thus, the spacetime state realism that Wallace and Timpson (2010) contemplate seems to imply, if conceived in the framework of the Everett interpretation, that every spacetime region has contradictory properties and makes true contradictory predicates. The same goes for the position that Allori et al. (2011) describe as Schrödinger’s first quantum theory. One can avoid this paradoxical consequence by conceiving the branching as concerning spacetime itself so that there are many branches of spacetime with definite properties existing in each of them. Be that as it may, the crucial point for present purposes is that there is a concrete structure of quantum entanglement through its being implemented in spacetime.
On Bohm’s quantum theory, quantum systems always have a definite position – and thus a definite trajectory – in spacetime, their position being an additional variable that is not specified by the wave-function. Bohmian quantum systems hence distinguish themselves by their position and thus are absolutely discernible. Nonetheless, Bohmian mechanics can also be interpreted in terms of OSR: OSR does not imply a failure of discernibility (see Ainsworth 2011). The crucial point for OSR is that the particles are subject to a holism in the following sense: the way in which the position of any given particle develops in time (its trajectory) is not locally, but globally determined, depending on the position of all the other particles in the universe. In brief, one can read the ontology of Bohmian mechanics as boiling down to particles’ positions and a global law of motion, spelling out how the positions of the particles taken together develop in time (see Goldstein 2006, sect. 5 and 15). In any case, Bohmian mechanics presupposes definite positions in spacetime of the entities that it acknowledges.
As regards interpretations that endorse reductions of quantum entanglement (‘collapse of the wave-function’), the one going back to Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986) (GRW) is the only one that is precisely worked out, postulating reductions of quantum entanglement in the form of spontaneous localizations of quantum systems. When it comes to the question of an ontology for GRW, there are two different proposals discussed in the literature. The proposal put forward by Ghirardi himself (Ghirardi et al. 1995) is the one of a mass density ontology: the mass of, say, an electron when it has not a determinate position is literally smeared out in physical space, creating thus a mass density field. That ontology suggests a reading in terms of OSR as well: there is a structure of correlated values of properties, which are smeared out values in the case of the GRW mass density ontology (density of stuff in physical space), instead of properties that provide for an intrinsic identity of the entities that instantiate them; this structure is a concrete physical structure through its being implemented by countable particle-like entities; it develops as a whole according to a certain law of motion, which in the case of GRW attributes to the structure a disposition or propensity for spontaneous localization whose strength depends on the number of particle-like entities standing in the structure in question (see Dorato and Esfeld 2010).
The other proposal for an ontology for GRW is due to Bell (1987, p. 205). The spontaneous localizations that GRW postulate are conceived as flashes centred around spacetime points. According to what is today known as the GRW flash theory (this term goes back to Tumulka 2006), these flashes are all there is in spacetime. Starting with an initial distribution of flashes in spacetime, the wave-function allows to calculate the probabilities for the occurrence of further flashes. Hence, on this view, the world is a structure of correlated flashes. By contrast to the structure of the GRW mass density, the flash structure is not continuous in spacetime, since the flashes are sparsely distributed. If one wants to consider the flashes as objects implementing a structure of correlated properties and thus being non-separable, these are quite “thin” objects in the sense of French (2010) indeed, since there is nothing more to the flashes than certain correlated properties being instantiated at spacetime points.
It is true that both the Bohm and the GRW theory can be read as subscribing to an ontological commitment not only to concrete entities in spacetime (particles, density of stuff, flashes), but also to the quantum mechanical wave-function, the latter one existing in a high-dimensional space that is known as configuration space (see e.g. the famous remark by Bell 1987, p. 128, on Bohm’s theory). However, in this case, the motivation for admitting the wave-function as an element of physical reality is that it guides the temporal development of the entities that are accepted as existing in three-dimensional space. Thus, again, these theories are based on being committed to the existence of four-dimensional spacetime.
In sum, whatever the pros and cons of each of these interpretations are, they all achieve an ontology of quantum entanglement by conceiving certain physical structures that are concrete physical structures through their being implemented or instantiated in spacetime. To put the crucial point for the present paper in a nutshell, employing John Bell’s terminology, we can say that there are no beables without local beables (see Bell 1987, ch. 7).
4.	The emergence of spacetime?
4.1	Physical aspects
Let us now come back to canonical QG and examine in this context the idea of the emergence of spacetime (and of local beables) from something more fundamental than spatio-temporal entities (this idea is employed in the literature in both physics and philosophy of physics, e.g. Butterfield and Isham 1999, Kiefer 2003, § 4.2.1, Wüthrich 2011). We first consider the physical aspects of such an emergence; we then argue that they do not actually correspond to ontological emergence in any serious sense and that the nature of the putative non-spatio-temporal fundamental level actually remains unspecified. As a consequence we suggest in the next section that the issue of the emergence of spacetime in canonical QG faces a dilemma.
The physics of the emergence of spacetime from the quantum geometrodynamical picture – according to which spacetime is possibly not fundamental – involves two main steps. The first one basically is a semi-classical approximation (combination of Born-Oppenheimer and WKB types of approximations). The Hamilton-Jacobi equivalent of the Einstein field equations of (semi-)classical GR can be recovered in the first order of the relevant expansion. The next order of approximation provides a (non-stationary) functional Schrödinger equation for matter fields on a (curved) classical spacetime background (in this sense, one recovers QFT in an external gravitational field or on a curved spacetime). This latter depends on a particular choice within the class of spacetimes corresponding to a solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. The (WKB) time parameter that appears in this functional Schrödinger equation depends on this solution. The following order of approximation can then be understood as quantum gravitational corrections to the functional Schrödinger equation (leading in turn to modifications in the definition of the WKB time).
At this stage, one might wonder whether such an approximation scheme is sufficient to account for the emergence of (classical) spacetime from the fundamental quantum level. However, it is important to understand that the superposition principle remains valid at the semi-classical level as well; so, superpositions of semi-classical states are generic and the difficulties for any spacetime understanding remain (besides, in the general cases, the approximation scheme cannot be implemented in a mathematically well-defined way, but only at a formal, heuristic level; it is nevertheless useful for cosmological applications, where the number of degrees of freedom is restricted by symmetry considerations). 
The second step of the physics of the emergence of spacetime heavily relies on quantum entanglement at the QG level. Indeed, the idea is to invoke some decoherence process in order to get rid of the problematic interference terms. The notion of decoherence requires some division between a ‘system’ and an ‘environment’, which is obviously not straightforward in the context of QG and quantum cosmology. The key point is to understand this division in terms of ‘relevant’ (‘system’) and ‘irrelevant’ (‘environment’) degrees of freedom. Fundamental quantum entanglement correlations among these degrees of freedom entail that the focus on the ‘relevant’ ones (the ones that are observationally accessible) leads to a diffusion of quantum coherence; the ‘irrelevant’ (‘environmental’) degrees of freedom are ‘traced out’ and the ‘relevant’ ones are encoded in the corresponding reduced density (state) operator, for which the interference terms are effectively suppressed (in particular, no interference between the semiclassical states). For instance, within quantum (geometrodynamical) cosmology, relevant degrees of freedom typically include global (and homogeneous) variables such as the scale factor, and irrelevant degrees of freedom are encoded by inhomogeneous variables (‘perturbations’) such as density fluctuations and gravitational waves (decoherence occurs within one semi-classical component of the total state as well as among different components, see Kiefer 2007, § 10.1.2).
This is all fine. However, as it is well-known from standard QM, decoherence alone does not clarify the fundamental interpretative issues that any quantum theory faces. In particular, making sense of the quantum gravitational state (wave functional) requires an interpretative framework: one can of course talk in terms of a quantum state of the universe and apply the superposition principle to that state, but one then has to be clear about what the ontological significance of the superposition principle is supposed to be (for instance, quantum cosmology is often understood within the Everett interpretation). In any case, in order to be entitled to use the notion of entanglement, one has to spell out an internal differentiation of that state in terms of a plurality of entities that are entangled with each other. We have seen in the preceding section that the main interpretations of quantum theory tend to show that any known such differentiation that yields a concrete physical structure by contrast to a mathematical structure defined on an abstract mathematical space entails a commitment to spacetime. It is immaterial to this issue whether spacetime is continuous or discrete, whether it possesses exactly four or more dimensions, and whether it is an entity on its own (substantivalism) or consists in spatiotemporal, metrical-gravitational relations among material entities. The point at issue is whether or not some spatio-temporally extended entities or other belong to the ontological ground floor, as far as the philosophy of physics is concerned.
Quantum entanglement and thus the non-separability of the entities subject to the entanglement is independent of the distance of these entities in space. But this fact does not justify the conclusion that non-separability somehow exists outside spacetime or, in other words, that the relations of quantum entanglement are somehow ontologically more fundamental than the metrical relations that make up spacetime. For it seems that there is no sense in which there could be concrete physical structures of entanglement (concrete relations of non-separability) unless they are implemented or instantiated in spacetime. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the commitment to quantum entanglement and non-separability implies the commitment to a non-local dynamics, whereby the dynamics being non-local entails that it applies to entities in spacetime. 
These considerations do of course not constitute an argument against QG being committed to entities that are ontologically more fundamental than spacetime. They only show that if there are such entities, it does not make sense to apply notions such as entanglement or non-separability to them (at least not in the common understanding of these notions within the main interpretative framework of quantum theory, see the preceding section). By way of consequence, OSR would be inappropriate to capture the fundamental ontology. Nonetheless, an ontologically serious story would have to be told how to get from such entities to spacetime and quantum entanglement in spacetime (and, finally, classical properties such as measurement outcomes or their appearance to observers). 
4.2	Emergence in what sense?
The physics of the emergence of spacetime in quantum geometrodynamics briefly sketched above suggests (notably through decoherence) that quantum entanglement is a fundamental feature of the quantum gravitational domain (straightforward considerations show that quantum entanglement is generic within LQG as well: strictly speaking, the quantum gravitational state corresponding to an arbitrary region of space is a mixed state – a ‘mixed spin network state’, the entanglement entropy of the region can indeed be computed, see Donnelly 2008). In the face of the arguments above, the very fact that quantum entanglement is invoked as a key feature of the QG level may indeed indicate that spatio-temporal notions are actually still at work at this fundamental level. In particular, it is not clear whether the differentiation – necessary to apply the notion of entanglement – implied by the distinction between relevant and irrelevant degrees of freedom can be made in an ontologically serious manner (without reference to putative observers) and independently of spatio-temporal notions (within LQG, the required differentiation is made by the underlying spatial 3-manifold over which the spin networks are defined). 
Indeed, there are two interrelated sets of problems for the idea of the ontological emergence of spacetime from a non-spatio-temporal level in canonical QG. First, the very notion of concrete physical entities that are not spatio-temporally extended needs to be clarified. In the face of the above discussion, a specification in terms of quantum structures does not play the right role (since according to the main interpretations, quantum structures need to be implemented in spacetime in order to be concrete physical structures by contrast to abstract mathematical ones). Second, it is doubtful whether any precise notion of ontological emergence is available in this context. In particular, no account is given how it could be possible that decoherence – being conceived as a process that is not in (space)time and that concerns entities which are supposed to exist independently of spacetime – can produce the required spatiotemporal picture involving local beables. 
Indeed, the difficulties with the notion of emergence in this context are quite general. We can distinguish between three ontological notions of emergence none of which is, however, applicable to the present case:
•	a temporal sense: For instance, organisms have emerged from inorganic matter during the evolution on Earth in the sense that at time t1, no organisms existed on Earth, whereas at time t2, organisms came into existence on Earth. However, if the notion of emergence is to describe a process that leads from an entity that is more fundamental than spacetime to the coming into being of spacetime, this cannot be a process in time. Thus, any temporal sense of emergence is ruled out.
•	a causal sense: Taking up the same example, one can maintain that organisms have emerged from inorganic matter during the evolution on Earth in the sense that at time t1, no organisms existed on Earth, whereas at time t2, organisms came into existence on Earth and that the inorganic matter that existed at time t1 (or some proper part of it) is the cause of the existence of the organisms at time t2 in the sense that it produced these organisms. However, it is difficult to see how this sense of emergence could be applied to the idea of spacetime emerging from an entity that is not spatio-temporal: in all known theories of causation, causes are distinct from their effects only by their difference in spatial and temporal localization. Even if one maintains that causes do not necessarily precede their effects, it is not clear how one could draw a distinction between cause and effect without relying on spacetime. There is of course a venerable theological discourse of God having created the world, so that there is a cause that is more fundamental than spacetime, creating spacetime as its effect, but it is not clear to what extent and in what sense that proposition can be taken literally. In any case, in the philosophy of physics, the point at issue is to elaborate on the idea of physical entities that are not spatiotemporal and an account of physical causation that makes clear how these entities bring spacetime into existence. It is in particular unclear what a change in an entity that is not spatiotemporal could be, and notably a change such that it is causally correlated with a change that amounts to the coming into being of spacetime.
•	a supervenience sense: if properties of type B (e.g. mental properties) supervene on properties of type A (e.g. neurobiological properties), one may in a loose and somewhat misleading sense say that the properties of type B emerge from properties of type A. This sense of “emergence” is at issue when one admits a fundamental level of the world that is not spatio-temporal, but fixes or determines the other levels in a non-causal and non-temporal sense. Supervenience implies covariation in the following sense: any variation in type B-properties necessarily involves a variation in type A-properties. However, there is no account available how a variation in spatio-temporal properties could involve a variation in the properties of a more fundamental entity that is not spatiotemporal; again, one encounters the difficulty how to conceive change without space and time.
In sum, for the time being, it remains unclear how to spell out an ontology according to which spacetime emerges from a more fundamental level. As things stand, the supposed emergence concerns only descriptions, but not ontology: in the search for a theory of canonical QG, one can in one’s mathematical descriptions abstract from spacetime and seek to recover spatio-temporal notions at a less fundamental level of description (as within the semi-classical analysis of quantum geometrodynamics and LQG, see above). But it remains unclear how to transform this move in one’s mathematical descriptions into a cogent ontology of the physical domain according to which spacetime is not fundamental, but emerges from some entities outside spacetime (Hedrich forthcoming reaches a similar assessment).
5.	Conclusion: a dilemma
As a consequence, we claim that canonical QG in its present state faces a dilemma. Either it is maintained that canonical QG still describes spatio-temporal aspects of the world at the fundamental level (including possible discrete, quantum features of spacetime), but then it has to be explained what makes them spatio-temporal at this fundamental quantum gravitational level (especially in the face of the standard arguments discussed in section 2). Or the talk of spacetime being (ontologically) non-fundamental (‘no space, no time at the fundamental level’) is taken seriously, but then an ontologically serious account of this non-spatio-temporal level and of the emergence of spatio-temporal notions would have to be developed (or their appearance would have to be accounted for – e.g. the timeless account of change and evolution within Rovelli’s partial observables framework is a first step in this direction, see Rickles 2006).
One can formulate the conclusion of the examination of this idea developed in this paper in the following manner: there are no beables without local beables. The crucial question then is how to introduce local beables in QG. One can in this context of course make the same move that Bohm’s theory makes with respect to non-relativistic QM, namely answering the question of what the formalism refers to in terms of additional variables that, then, are the local beables (see notably Callender and Weingard 1994, 1996 and Goldstein and Teufel 2001 for a discussion of the Bohmian approach to canonical QG); such a move would amount to taking up the first horn of the dilemma. This choice would still have to face the difficulties linked with the background independence (diffeomorphism invariance) of the theory.
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